Integrating Flexible Support for Security Policies into the Linux Operating System
Proceedings of the FREENIX Track: 2001 USENIX Annual Technical Conference
ACM SIGOPS Operating Systems Review
On protection in operating systems
SOSP '75 Proceedings of the fifth ACM symposium on Operating systems principles
SP '92 Proceedings of the 1992 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Towards a formal model for security policies specification and validation in the selinux system
Proceedings of the ninth ACM symposium on Access control models and technologies
An attribute-based access matrix model
Proceedings of the 2005 ACM symposium on Applied computing
Towards Formal Verification of Role-Based Access Control Policies
IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing
Protection: principles and practice
AFIPS '72 (Spring) Proceedings of the May 16-18, 1972, spring joint computer conference
The next 700 access control models or a unifying meta-model?
Proceedings of the 14th ACM symposium on Access control models and technologies
Rumpole: a flexible break-glass access control model
Proceedings of the 16th ACM symposium on Access control models and technologies
PrimAndroid: Privacy Policy Modelling and Analysis for Android Applications
POLICY '11 Proceedings of the 2011 IEEE International Symposium on Policies for Distributed Systems and Networks
Heuristic safety analysis of access control models
Proceedings of the 18th ACM symposium on Access control models and technologies
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Formal security models have significantly improved the understanding of access control systems. They have influenced the way access control policies are specified and analyzed, and they provide a sound foundation for a policy's implementation. While their merits are many, designing security models is not an easy task, and their use in commercial systems is still far from everyday practice. This paper argues that model engineering principles and tools supporting these principles are important steps towards model based security engineering. It proposes a model engineering approach based on the idea that access control models share a common, model-independent core that, by core specialization and core extension, can be tailored to a broad scope of domain-specific access control models.