Communications of the ACM
Protection and the control of information sharing in multics
Communications of the ACM
A note on the confinement problem
Communications of the ACM
Protection in an information processing utility
Communications of the ACM
Programming semantics for multiprogrammed computations
Communications of the ACM
ACM SIGOPS Operating Systems Review
ACM '73 Proceedings of the ACM annual conference
Protection in programmed systems.
Protection in programmed systems.
Cops--a protection mechanism for computer systems.
Cops--a protection mechanism for computer systems.
Formal languages and their relation to automata
Formal languages and their relation to automata
A Linear Time Algorithm for Deciding Subject Security
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Certification of programs for secure information flow
Communications of the ACM
A lattice model of secure information flow
Communications of the ACM
Root Kits: an operating systems viewpoint
ACM SIGOPS Operating Systems Review
Language based policy analysis in a SPKI Trust Management System
Journal of Computer Security
EON: modeling and analyzing dynamic access control systems with logic programs
Proceedings of the 15th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Bounded memory Dolev-Yao adversaries in collaborative systems
FAST'10 Proceedings of the 7th International conference on Formal aspects of security and trust
Journal of Network and Systems Management
SEAL: a logic programming framework for specifying and verifying access control models
Proceedings of the 16th ACM symposium on Access control models and technologies
Automatic error finding in access-control policies
Proceedings of the 18th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Towards access control model engineering
ICISS'11 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Information Systems Security
Heuristic safety analysis of access control models
Proceedings of the 18th ACM symposium on Access control models and technologies
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A model of protection mechanisms in computing systems is presented and its appropriateness is demonstrated. The “safety” problem for protection systems under our model is to determine in a given situation whether a subject can acquire a particular right to an object. In restricted cases, one can show that this problem is decidable, i.e., there is an algorithm to determine whether a system in a particular configuration is safe. In general, and under surprisingly weak assumptions, one cannot decide if a situation is safe. Various implications of this fact are discussed.