A logical framework for reasoning about access control models
SACMAT '01 Proceedings of the sixth ACM symposium on Access control models and technologies
On the specification and evolution of access control policies
SACMAT '01 Proceedings of the sixth ACM symposium on Access control models and technologies
Managing access control policies using access control spaces
SACMAT '02 Proceedings of the seventh ACM symposium on Access control models and technologies
A System to Specify and Manage Multipolicy Access Control Models
POLICY '02 Proceedings of the 3rd International Workshop on Policies for Distributed Systems and Networks (POLICY'02)
Analyzing consistency of security policies
SP '97 Proceedings of the 1997 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Policy management using access control spaces
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
Towards a formal model for security policies specification and validation in the selinux system
Proceedings of the ninth ACM symposium on Access control models and technologies
Verifying information flow goals in security-enhanced Linux
Journal of Computer Security - Special issue on WITS'03
ACSAC '06 Proceedings of the 22nd Annual Computer Security Applications Conference
The flask security architecture: system support for diverse security policies
SSYM'99 Proceedings of the 8th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 8
Shame on trust in distributed systems
HOTSEC'06 Proceedings of the 1st USENIX Workshop on Hot Topics in Security
From trusted to secure: building and executing applications that enforce system security
ATC'07 2007 USENIX Annual Technical Conference on Proceedings of the USENIX Annual Technical Conference
Language-based information-flow security
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
SEAL: a logic programming framework for specifying and verifying access control models
Proceedings of the 16th ACM symposium on Access control models and technologies
Transforming commodity security policies to enforce Clark-Wilson integrity
Proceedings of the 28th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference
Using security policies to automate placement of network intrusion prevention
ESSoS'13 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Engineering Secure Software and Systems
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The SELinux mandatory access control (MAC) policy has recently added a multilevel security (MLS) model which is able to express a fine granularity of control over a subject's access rights. The problem is that the richness of the SELinux MLS model makes it impractical to manually evaluate that a given policy meets certain specific properties. To address this issue, we have modeled the SELinux MLS model, using a logical specification and implemented that specification in the Prolog language. Furthermore, we have developed some analyses for testing information flow properties of a given policy as well as an algorithm to determine whether one policy is compliant with another. We have implemented these analyses in Prolog and compiled our implementation into a tool for SELinux MLS policy analysis, called PALMS. Using PALMS, we verified some important properties of the SELinux MLS reference policy, namely that it satisfies the simple security condition and ⋆-property defined by Bell and LaPadula. We also evaluated whether the policy associated to a given application is compliant with the policy of the SELinux system in which it would be deployed.