NSPW '96 Proceedings of the 1996 workshop on New security paradigms
Proceedings of the workshop on virtual computer systems
Practical Domain and Type Enforcement for UNIX
SP '95 Proceedings of the 1995 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Janus: an Approach for Confinement of Untrusted Applications
Janus: an Approach for Confinement of Untrusted Applications
Towards a formal model for security policies specification and validation in the selinux system
Proceedings of the ninth ACM symposium on Access control models and technologies
SubDomain: Parsimonious Server Security
LISA '00 Proceedings of the 14th USENIX conference on System administration
Security and Usability
Aligning usability and security: a usability study of Polaris
SOUPS '06 Proceedings of the second symposium on Usable privacy and security
Polaris: virus-safe computing for Windows XP
Communications of the ACM - Privacy and security in highly dynamic systems
Improving host security with system call policies
SSYM'03 Proceedings of the 12th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 12
TRON: process-specific file protection for the UNIX operating system
TCON'95 Proceedings of the USENIX 1995 Technical Conference Proceedings
Bitfrost: the one laptop per child security model
Proceedings of the 3rd symposium on Usable privacy and security
Secure isolation of untrusted legacy applications
LISA'07 Proceedings of the 21st conference on Large Installation System Administration Conference
Alcatraz: An Isolated Environment for Experimenting with Untrusted Software
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
Reusability of Functionality-Based Application Confinement Policy Abstractions
ICICS '08 Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Information and Communications Security
The Factor Structure of the System Usability Scale
HCD 09 Proceedings of the 1st International Conference on Human Centered Design: Held as Part of HCI International 2009
SEEdit: SELinux security policy configuration system with higher level language
LISA'09 Proceedings of the 23rd conference on Large installation system administration
Techniques for Automating Policy Specification for Application-oriented Access Controls
ARES '11 Proceedings of the 2011 Sixth International Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security
The structure of authority: why security is not a separable concern
MOZ'04 Proceedings of the Second international conference on Multiparadigm Programming in Mozart/Oz
An empirical study of three access control systems
Proceedings of the 6th International Conference on Security of Information and Networks
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Protecting end users from security threats is an extremely difficult, but increasingly critical, problem. Traditional security models that focused on separating users from each other have proven ineffective in an environment of widespread software vulnerabilities and rampant malware. However, alternative approaches that provide more finely grained security generally require greater expertise than typical end users can reasonably be expected to have, and consequently have had limited success. The functionality-based application confinement (FBAC) model is designed to allow end users with limited expertise to assign applications hierarchical and parameterised policy abstractions based upon the functionalities each program is intended to perform. To validate the feasibility of this approach and assess the usability of existing mechanisms, a usability study was conducted comparing an implementation of the FBAC model with the widely used Linux-based SELinux and AppArmor security schemes. The results showed that the functionality-based mechanism enabled end users to effectively control the privileges of their applications with far greater success than widely used alternatives. In particular, policies created using FBAC were more likely to be enforced and exhibited significantly lower risk exposure, while not interfering with the ability of the application to perform its intended task. In addition to the success of the functionality-based approach, the usability study also highlighted a number of limitations and problems with existing mechanisms. These results indicate that a functionality-based approach has significant potential in terms of enabling end users with limited expertise to defend themselves against insecure and malicious software.