Untraceable electronic mail, return addresses, and digital pseudonyms
Communications of the ACM
Traffic Analysis Attacks and Trade-Offs in Anonymity Providing Systems
IHW '01 Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Information Hiding
k-anonymity: a model for protecting privacy
International Journal of Uncertainty, Fuzziness and Knowledge-Based Systems
Tor: the second-generation onion router
SSYM'04 Proceedings of the 13th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 13
On flow correlation attacks and countermeasures in mix networks
PET'04 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Privacy Enhancing Technologies
Timing analysis in low-latency mix networks: attacks and defenses
ESORICS'06 Proceedings of the 11th European conference on Research in Computer Security
Privacy vulnerabilities in encrypted HTTP streams
PET'05 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Privacy Enhancing Technologies
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The level of anonymity offered by low latency, interactive, anonymous networks is unknown. This paper implements correlation attacks on the deployed Tor network and a simulated Tor network under defined network conditions. The accuracy of the attacks act as a metric for the networks anonymity in the face of a passive adversary. From observation of the deployed Tor network, several techniques were developed to compensate for some of the modifications the Tor protocol induces in traffic. These techniques increase correlation accuracy by 10% to 40% for differing correlation functions. Almost 50% of traffic streams on the simulated network are identified immediately with 10% of experimental traffic on the real Tor network identified.