Distributed agreement in the presence of processor and communication faults
IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering
STOC '87 Proceedings of the nineteenth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Completeness theorems for non-cryptographic fault-tolerant distributed computation
STOC '88 Proceedings of the twentieth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Multiparty unconditionally secure protocols
STOC '88 Proceedings of the twentieth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Verifiable secret sharing and multiparty protocols with honest majority
STOC '89 Proceedings of the twenty-first annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Perfectly secure message transmission
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
From partial consistency to global broadcast
STOC '00 Proceedings of the thirty-second annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
The Byzantine Generals Problem
ACM Transactions on Programming Languages and Systems (TOPLAS)
Consensus With Dual Failure Modes
IEEE Transactions on Parallel and Distributed Systems
A Continuum of Failure Models for Distributed Computing
WDAG '92 Proceedings of the 6th International Workshop on Distributed Algorithms
Efficient Byzantine Agreement Secure Against General Adversaries
DISC '98 Proceedings of the 12th International Symposium on Distributed Computing
Secure Computation without Agreement
DISC '02 Proceedings of the 16th International Conference on Distributed Computing
Parallel Reducibility for Information-Theoretically Secure Computation
CRYPTO '00 Proceedings of the 20th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Foundations of Secure Interactive Computing
CRYPTO '91 Proceedings of the 11th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Trading Correctness for Privacy in Unconditional Multi-Party Computation (Extended Abstract)
CRYPTO '98 Proceedings of the 18th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Efficient Secure Multi-party Computation
ASIACRYPT '00 Proceedings of the 6th International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security: Advances in Cryptology
Polynomial algorithms for multiple processor agreement
STOC '82 Proceedings of the fourteenth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Consensus in Synchronous Systems: A Concise Guided Tour
PRDC '02 Proceedings of the 2002 Pacific Rim International Symposium on Dependable Computing
Uniform Agreement Despite Process Omission Failures
IPDPS '03 Proceedings of the 17th International Symposium on Parallel and Distributed Processing
A Model for Asynchronous Reactive Systems and its Application to Secure Message Transmission
SP '01 Proceedings of the 2001 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Issues of fault tolerance in concurrent computations (databases, reliability, transactions, agreement protocols, distributed computing)
Protocols for secure computations
SFCS '82 Proceedings of the 23rd Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Towards optimal distributed consensus
SFCS '89 Proceedings of the 30th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
On combining privacy with guaranteed output delivery in secure multiparty computation
CRYPTO'06 Proceedings of the 26th annual international conference on Advances in Cryptology
Secure computation with partial message loss
TCC'06 Proceedings of the Third conference on Theory of Cryptography
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In secure multi-party computation, the different ways in which the adversary can control the corrupted players are described by different corruption types. The three most common corruption types are active corruption (the adversary has full control over the corrupted player), passive corruption (the adversary sees what the corrupted player sees) and fail-corruption (the adversary can force the corrupted player to crash irrevocably ). Because fail-corruption is inadequate for modeling recoverable failures, the so-called omission corruption was proposed and studied mainly in the context of Byzantine Agreement (BA). It allows the adversary to selectively block messages sent from and to the corrupted player, but without actually seeing the message. In this paper we propose a modular study of omission failures in MPC, by introducing the notions of send-omission (the adversary can selectively block outgoing messages) and receive-omission (the adversary can selectively block incoming messages) corruption. We provide security definitions for protocols tolerating a threshold adversary who can actively, receive-omission, and send-omission corrupt up to t a , t ρ , and t *** players, respectively. We show that the condition 3t a + t ρ + t *** n is necessary and sufficient for perfectly secure MPC tolerating such an adversary. Along the way we provide perfectly secure protocols for BA under the same bound. As an implication of our results, we show that an adversary who actively corrupts up to t a players and omission corrupts (according to the already existing notion) up to t *** players can be tolerated for perfectly secure MPC if 3t a + 2t *** n . This significantly improves a result by Koo in TCC 2006.