STOC '87 Proceedings of the nineteenth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
STOC '91 Proceedings of the twenty-third annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
CCS '99 Proceedings of the 6th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Regulating service access and information release on the Web
Proceedings of the 7th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Rethinking Public Key Infrastructures and Digital Certificates: Building in Privacy
Rethinking Public Key Infrastructures and Digital Certificates: Building in Privacy
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
Identity-Based Encryption from the Weil Pairing
SIAM Journal on Computing
k-anonymity: a model for protecting privacy
International Journal of Uncertainty, Fuzziness and Knowledge-Based Systems
Binder, a Logic-Based Security Language
SP '02 Proceedings of the 2002 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Towards Practical Automated Trust Negotiation
POLICY '02 Proceedings of the 3rd International Workshop on Policies for Distributed Systems and Networks (POLICY'02)
Trust-X: A Peer-to-Peer Framework for Trust Establishment
IEEE Transactions on Knowledge and Data Engineering
Distributed Proving in Access-Control Systems
SP '05 Proceedings of the 2005 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Remote Physical Device Fingerprinting
IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing
PeerAccess: a logic for distributed authorization
Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Secure context-sensitive authorization
Pervasive and Mobile Computing
Mondrian Multidimensional K-Anonymity
ICDE '06 Proceedings of the 22nd International Conference on Data Engineering
\ell -Diversity: Privacy Beyond \kappa -Anonymity
ICDE '06 Proceedings of the 22nd International Conference on Data Engineering
OACerts: Oblivious Attribute Certificates
IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing
M-invariance: towards privacy preserving re-publication of dynamic datasets
Proceedings of the 2007 ACM SIGMOD international conference on Management of data
Lightweight cnsistency enforcement schemes for distributed proofs with hidden subtrees
Proceedings of the 12th ACM symposium on Access control models and technologies
Robust De-anonymization of Large Sparse Datasets
SP '08 Proceedings of the 2008 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Enforcing Safety and Consistency Constraints in Policy-Based Authorization Systems
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
Automated trust negotiation using cryptographic credentials
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
Public-key cryptosystems based on composite degree residuosity classes
EUROCRYPT'99 Proceedings of the 17th international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
A construction for general and efficient oblivious commitment based envelope protocols
ICICS'06 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Information and Communications Security
Calibrating noise to sensitivity in private data analysis
TCC'06 Proceedings of the Third conference on Theory of Cryptography
Effective trust management through a hybrid logical and relational approach
ASIACCS '10 Proceedings of the 5th ACM Symposium on Information, Computer and Communications Security
Oblivious enforcement of hidden information release policies
ASIACCS '10 Proceedings of the 5th ACM Symposium on Information, Computer and Communications Security
Confidentiality-preserving proof theories for distributed proof systems
Proceedings of the 6th ACM Symposium on Information, Computer and Communications Security
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Distributed proof construction protocols have been shown to be valuable for reasoning about authorization decisions in open distributed environments such as pervasive computing spaces. Unfortunately, existing distributed proof protocols offer only limited support for protecting the confidentiality of sensitive facts, which limits their utility in many practical scenarios. In this paper, we propose a distributed proof construction protocol in which the release of a fact's truth value can be made contingent upon facts managed by other principals in the system. We formally prove that our protocol can safely prove conjunctions of facts without leaking the truth values of individual facts, even in the face of colluding adversaries and fact release policies with cyclical dependencies. This facilitates the definition of context-sensitive release policies that enable the conditional use of sensitive facts in distributed proofs.