SAWM: a tool for secure and authenticated web metering
SEKE '02 Proceedings of the 14th international conference on Software engineering and knowledge engineering
Signature-Based Methods for Data Streams
Data Mining and Knowledge Discovery
Duplicate detection in click streams
WWW '05 Proceedings of the 14th international conference on World Wide Web
Using association rules for fraud detection in web advertising networks
VLDB '05 Proceedings of the 31st international conference on Very large data bases
Defending against the wily surfer: web based attacks and defenses
ID'99 Proceedings of the 1st conference on Workshop on Intrusion Detection and Network Monitoring - Volume 1
Optimal Search Engine Marketing Strategy
International Journal of Electronic Commerce
Contextual Marketing and Customer-Orientation Strategy for E-Commerce: An Empirical Analysis
International Journal of Electronic Commerce
Identifying Locations for Targeted Advertising on the Internet
International Journal of Electronic Commerce
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Click fraud occurs when a Web user clicks on a sponsored link with the malicious intent of hurting a competitor or gaining undue monetary benefits. Advertisers and the media accuse search engines of not doing enough to curb this practice. This paper develops a game-theoretical model of click fraud in a publisher network that sheds light on the economic trade-offs search engines face. On the supply side, search engines try to create incentives for publishers to generate clicks honestly and to reward honest publishers who generate legitimate clicks. The negative strategic effect of undercounting invalid clicks deters the search engine from undercounting. Since better filtering is beneficial to search engines, publishers, and advertisers, search engines have an incentive to invest in filtering technology.