Model checking race-freeness

  • Authors:
  • Parosh Aziz Abdulla;Frédéric Haziza;Mats Kindahl

  • Affiliations:
  • Uppsala University, Sweden;Uppsala University, Sweden;Sun Microsystems, Database Technology Group

  • Venue:
  • ACM SIGARCH Computer Architecture News
  • Year:
  • 2009

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Abstract

With the introduction of highly concurrent systems in standard desktop computers, ensuring correctness of industrial-size concurrent programs is becoming increasingly important. One of the most important standards in use for developing multi-threaded programs is the POSIX Threads standard, commonly known as PThreads. Of particular importance, the analysis of industrial code should, as far as possible, be automatic and not require annotations or other forms of specifications of the code. Model checking has been one of the most successful approaches to program verification during the last two decades. The size and complexity of applications which can be handled have increased rapidly through integration with symbolic techniques. These methods are designed to work on finite (but large) state spaces. This framework fails to deal with several essential aspects of behaviours for multithreaded programs: there is no bound a priori on the number of threads which may arise in a given run of the system; each thread manipulates local variables which often range over unbounded domains; and the system has a dynamic structure in the sense that threads can be created and killed throughout execution of the system. In this paper we concentrate on checking a particular class of properties for concurrent programs, namely safety properties. In particular, we focus on race-freeness, that is, the absence of race conditions (also known as data races) in shared-variable pthreaded programs. We will follow a particular methodology which we have earlier developed for model checking general classes of infinite-state systems [1, 3, 6, 8, 9] and apply a symbolic backward reachability analysis to verify the safety property. Since we construct a model as an over-approximation of the original program, proving the safety property in the model implies that the property also holds in the original system. Surprisingly, it leads to a quite efficient analysis which can be carried out fully automatically.