Nonmonotonic reasoning, preferential models and cumulative logics
Artificial Intelligence
Propositional knowledge base revision and minimal change
Artificial Intelligence
Handbook of logic in artificial intelligence and logic programming (Vol. 4)
Modal logic
Relations between the logic of theory change and nonmonotonic logic
Proceedings of the Workshop on The Logic of Theory Change
Axiomatic characterization of the AGM theory of belief revision in a temporal logic
Artificial Intelligence
Dynamic Epistemic Logic
AGM belief revision in dynamic games
Proceedings of the 13th Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge
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We establish a correspondence between the rationalizability of choice studied in the revealed preference literature and the notion of minimal belief revision captured by the AGM postulates. A choice frame consists of a set of alternatives @W, a collection E of subsets of @W (representing possible choice sets) and a function f:E-2^@W (representing choices made). A choice frame is rationalizable if there exists a total pre-order R on @W such that, for every E@?E, f(E) coincides with the best elements of E relative to R. We re-interpret choice structures in terms of belief revision. An interpretation is obtained by adding a valuation V that assigns to every atom p the subset of @W at which p is true. Associated with an interpretation is an initial belief set and a partial belief revision function. A choice frame is AGM-consistent if, for every interpretation of it, the associated partial belief revision function can be extended to a full-domain belief revision function that satisfies the AGM postulates. It is shown that a finite choice frame is AGM-consistent if and only if it is rationalizable.