Axiomatic characterization of the AGM theory of belief revision in a temporal logic

Authors:
Giacomo Bonanno
Affiliations:
Department of Economics, University of California, Davis, CA 95616-8578, USA
Venue:
Artificial Intelligence
Year:
2007

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Abstract

Since belief revision deals with the interaction of belief and information over time, branching-time temporal logic seems a natural setting for a theory of belief change. We propose two extensions of a modal logic that, besides the next-time temporal operator, contains a belief operator and an information operator. The first logic is shown to provide an axiomatic characterization of the first six postulates of the AGM theory of belief revision, while the second, stronger, logic provides an axiomatic characterization of the full set of AGM postulates.