Nonmonotonic reasoning, preferential models and cumulative logics
Artificial Intelligence
Nonmonotonic inference based on expectations
Artificial Intelligence
On the logic of iterated belief revision
Artificial Intelligence
Revisions of Knowledge Systems Using Epistemic Entrenchment
Proceedings of the 2nd Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Reasoning about Knowledge
Changing Conditional Belief Unconditionally
Proceedings of the Sixth Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge
On the logic of iterated belief revision
TARK '94 Proceedings of the 5th conference on Theoretical aspects of reasoning about knowledge
IJCAI'95 Proceedings of the 14th international joint conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 2
Artificial Intelligence - Special issue on nonmonotonic reasoning
Iterated belief revision, revised
Artificial Intelligence
Axiomatic characterization of the AGM theory of belief revision in a temporal logic
Artificial Intelligence
On the Dynamics of Total Preorders: Revising Abstract Interval Orders
ECSQARU '07 Proceedings of the 9th European Conference on Symbolic and Quantitative Approaches to Reasoning with Uncertainty
Conflicts between Relevance-Sensitive and Iterated Belief Revision
Proceedings of the 2008 conference on ECAI 2008: 18th European Conference on Artificial Intelligence
A General Model for Epistemic State Revision using Plausibility Measures
Proceedings of the 2008 conference on ECAI 2008: 18th European Conference on Artificial Intelligence
AAAI'08 Proceedings of the 23rd national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
A semantic approach for iterated revision in possibilistic logic
AAAI'08 Proceedings of the 23rd national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Admissible and restrained revision
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Iterated belief contraction from first principles
IJCAI'07 Proceedings of the 20th international joint conference on Artifical intelligence
Reconstructing an agent's epistemic state from observations
IJCAI'05 Proceedings of the 19th international joint conference on Artificial intelligence
Iterated belief revision, revised
IJCAI'05 Proceedings of the 19th international joint conference on Artificial intelligence
Two Approaches to Iterated Belief Contraction
KSEM '09 Proceedings of the 3rd International Conference on Knowledge Science, Engineering and Management
AGM belief revision in dynamic games
Proceedings of the 13th Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge
Iterated belief change due to actions and observations
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Logic-based fusion of complex epistemic states
ECSQARU'11 Proceedings of the 11th European conference on Symbolic and quantitative approaches to reasoning with uncertainty
Parallel belief revision: Revising by sets of formulas
Artificial Intelligence
Taking Levi identity seriously: a plea for iterated belief contraction
KSEM'06 Proceedings of the First international conference on Knowledge Science, Engineering and Management
Revising beliefs on the basis of evidence
International Journal of Approximate Reasoning
On the logic of iterated non-prioritised revision
WCII'02 Proceedings of the 2002 international conference on Conditionals, Information, and Inference
Revising by an inconsistent set of formulas
IJCAI'11 Proceedings of the Twenty-Second international joint conference on Artificial Intelligence - Volume Volume Two
Considerations on belief revision in an action theory
Correct Reasoning
Revision over partial pre-orders: a postulational study
SUM'12 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Scalable Uncertainty Management
AI'12 Proceedings of the 25th Australasian joint conference on Advances in Artificial Intelligence
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The AGM approach to belief change is not geared to provide a decent account of iterated belief change. Darwiche and Pearl have sought to extend the AGM proposal in an interesting way to deal with this problem. We show that the original Darwiche-Pearl approach is, on the one hand excessively strong and, on the other rather limited in scope. The later Darwiche-Pearl approach, we argue, although it addresses the first problem, still remains rather permissive. We address both these issues by (1) assuming a dynamic revision operator that changes to a new revision operator after each instance of belief change, and (2) strengthening the Darwiche-Pearl proposal. Moreover, we provide constructions of this dynamic revision operator via entrenchment kinematics as well as a simple form of lexicographic revision, and prove representation results connecting these accounts.