Propositional knowledge base revision and minimal change
Artificial Intelligence
On the logic of iterated belief revision
Artificial Intelligence
A logical theory of nonmonotonic inference and belief change
A logical theory of nonmonotonic inference and belief change
Dynamic belief revision operators
Artificial Intelligence
Iterated belief revision, revised
Artificial Intelligence
From Belief Change to Preference Change
Proceedings of the 2008 conference on ECAI 2008: 18th European Conference on Artificial Intelligence
A General Model for Epistemic State Revision using Plausibility Measures
Proceedings of the 2008 conference on ECAI 2008: 18th European Conference on Artificial Intelligence
Revision sequences and nested conditionals
IJCAI'93 Proceedings of the 13th international joint conference on Artifical intelligence - Volume 1
Revision of partially ordered information: axiomatization, semantics and iteration
IJCAI'05 Proceedings of the 19th international joint conference on Artificial intelligence
On the revision of probabilistic beliefs using uncertain evidence
Artificial Intelligence
Conditionals in nonmonotonic reasoning and belief revision: considering conditionals as agents
Conditionals in nonmonotonic reasoning and belief revision: considering conditionals as agents
Revision Rules in the Theory of Evidence
ICTAI '10 Proceedings of the 2010 22nd IEEE International Conference on Tools with Artificial Intelligence - Volume 01
A framework for managing uncertain inputs: An axiomization of rewarding
International Journal of Approximate Reasoning
A change model for credibility partial order
SUM'11 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Scalable uncertainty management
IJCAI'11 Proceedings of the Twenty-Second international joint conference on Artificial Intelligence - Volume Volume Two
| Hi-index | 0.00 |
Belief revision is the process that incorporates, in a consistent way, a new piece of information, called input, into a belief base. When both belief bases and inputs are propositional formulas, a set of natural and rational properties, known as AGM postulates, have been proposed to define genuine revision operations. This paper addresses the following important issue : How to revise a partially pre-ordered information (representing initial beliefs) with a new partially pre-ordered information (representing inputs) while preserving AGM postulates? We first provide a particular representation of partial pre-orders (called units) using the concept of closed sets of units. Then we restate AGM postulates in this framework by defining counterparts of the notions of logical entailment and logical consistency. In the second part of the paper, we provide some examples of revision operations that respect our set of postulates. We also prove that our revision methods extend well-known lexicographic revision and natural revision for both cases where the input is either a single propositional formula or a total pre-order.