Dynamics of Rule Revision and Strategy Revision in Legislative Games

Authors:
Moshe Looks;Ronald P. Loui;Barry Z. Cynamon
Affiliations:
Dept. of Computer Science, Washington University in St. Louis, USA;Dept. of Computer Science, Washington University in St. Louis, USA;Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago, USA
Venue:
Proceedings of the 2005 conference on Legal Knowledge and Information Systems: JURIX 2005: The Eighteenth Annual Conference
Year:
2005

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Abstract

Many legislative games of interest defy classical assumptions and techniques; they tend to be open-ended, with weakly defined objectives, and either noncompetitive or pseudo-competitive. We introduce a conceptual and mathematical framework for grappling with such systems. Simulation results are presented for basic specifications of the framework that exhibit a number of qualitative phenomena overlapping with real-world dynamics across a broad spectrum of settings, including aspects of financial regulation and academic decision procedures, that as we demonstrate, may be viewed through the lens of our framework.