Local vs Global Policies and Centralized vs Decentralized Control in Virtual Communities of Agents
WI '04 Proceedings of the 2004 IEEE/WIC/ACM International Conference on Web Intelligence
Emergence of Norms with Biased Interactions in Heterogeneous Agent Societies
WI-IATW '07 Proceedings of the 2007 IEEE/WIC/ACM International Conferences on Web Intelligence and Intelligent Agent Technology - Workshops
Norm emergence under constrained interactions in diverse societies
Proceedings of the 7th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems - Volume 2
Dynamics of Rule Revision and Strategy Revision in Legislative Games
Proceedings of the 2005 conference on Legal Knowledge and Information Systems: JURIX 2005: The Eighteenth Annual Conference
Emergence of norms through social learning
IJCAI'07 Proceedings of the 20th international joint conference on Artifical intelligence
Effects of social network topology and options on norm emergence
COIN'09 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Coordination, organizations, institutions, and norms in agent systems
Normative multiagent systems and trust dynamics
Trusting Agents for Trusting Electronic Societies
Delegation of power in normative multiagent systems
DEON'06 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Deontic Logic and Artificial Normative Systems
CLIMA'05 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Computational Logic in Multi-Agent Systems
A distributed architecture for enforcing norms in open MAS
AAMAS'11 Proceedings of the 10th international conference on Advanced Agent Technology
MaNEA: A distributed architecture for enforcing norms in open MAS
Engineering Applications of Artificial Intelligence
Norm Emergence with Biased Agents
International Journal of Agent Technologies and Systems
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When agents make decisions, they have to deal with norms regulatingthe system. In this paper we therefore propose a rule-basedqualitative decision and game theory combining ideas frommultiagent systems and normative systems. Whereas normative systemsare typically modelled as a single authority that imposesobligations and permissions on the agents, our theory is based on amultiagent structure of the normative system. We distinguishbetween agents whose behavior is governed by norms, so-calleddefender agents who have the duty to monitor violations of thesenorms and apply sanctions, and autonomous normative systems thatissue norms and watch over the behavior of defender agents. We showthat autonomous normative systems can delegate monitoring andsanctioning of violations to defender agents, when bearers ofobligations model defender agents, which in turn model autonomousnormative systems.