Cryptographic defense against traffic analysis
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SNDSS '96 Proceedings of the 1996 Symposium on Network and Distributed System Security (SNDSS '96)
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WISA'04 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Information Security Applications
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We propose a peer-to-peer (P2P) architecture where the identity of nodes holding data remains hidden, but the information itself can be efficiently fetched. This architecture can be used to protect P2P networks against malicious attacks towards nodes holding important data. In particular, our protocol can be used for maintaining access to revocation lists, blacklists and similar data, which are of growing importance for modern P2P protocols.