Controlled Physical Random Functions
ACSAC '02 Proceedings of the 18th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference
An embedded true random number generator for FPGAs
FPGA '04 Proceedings of the 2004 ACM/SIGDA 12th international symposium on Field programmable gate arrays
Bio-Inspired Electronic-Mutation with genetic properties for Secured Identification
BLISS '07 Proceedings of the 2007 ECSIS Symposium on Bio-inspired, Learning, and Intelligent Systems for Security
Clone-Resistant DNA-Like Secured Dynamic Identity
BLISS '08 Proceedings of the 2008 Bio-inspired, Learning and Intelligent Systems for Security
Secure vehicular communication systems: design and architecture
IEEE Communications Magazine
Secure vehicular communication systems: implementation, performance, and research challenges
IEEE Communications Magazine
| Hi-index | 0.00 |
Most popular attacks on vehicular systems involve replacing legal by fake physical unit or manipulating existing system elements. Cars incorporate many functional units such as the odometer and maintenance counters, which have to be uniquely identified and supposed to stay manipulation-free for the virtual vehicle lifetime of about 15 years. A novel clone-resisting technology is proposed for vehicular environment. The particular resulting property is that even the participating vehicular manufacturers can hardly clone own fabricated units. A new physical architecture and unit personalization process are implemented in the production scenario such that fair and controllable production license agreements can be enforced. Vehicular production includes many sub-contractors manufacturing sub-units therefore a new multi-identity certification is embedded and linked to a scalable authentication protocol. The identity is kept in a living/dynamic process such that even if a cloning attack was successful at some time point, it would be soon identified for sure in later transactions. This fact is frustrating for system attackers as the attack's costs are too high and the use out of a successful attack becomes negligible. Authentic physical hardware anchor can build the basis for a trustable secured vehicular communication system as indicated in [10] and [11]. A short risk and threat analysis is demonstrating the security stability of the system.