A game theoretic trust model for on-line distributed evolution of cooperation inMANETs
Journal of Network and Computer Applications
Perspectives of selfish behaviour in mobile ad hoc networks
NMA'10 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Numerical methods and applications
Solving soft security problem in MANETs using an evolutionary approach
SIIS'11 Proceedings of the 2011 international conference on Security and Intelligent Information Systems
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A mobile wireless ad hoc network (MANET) consists of a number of devices that form a temporary network operating without support of a fixed infrastructure. The correct operation of such a network requires its users to cooperate on the level of packet forwarding. However, a distributed nature of MANET, lack of a single authority, and limited battery resources of participating devices may lead to a noncooperative behavior of network users, resulting in a degradation of the network throughput. Thus, a cooperation enforcement system specifying certain packet forwarding strategies is a necessity is such networks. In this work we investigate general properties of such a system. We introduce a Prisoner's Dilemma-based model of packet forwarding and next using an evolutionary game-theoretical approach we demonstrate that cooperation very likely to be developed on the basis of conditionally cooperative strategies similar to the TIT-FOR-TAT strategy.