Perspectives of selfish behaviour in mobile ad hoc networks

Authors:
Marcin Seredynski;Pascal Bouvry
Affiliations:
University of Luxembourg, Interdisciplinary Centre for Security, Luxembourg, Luxembourg;University of Luxembourg, Faculty of Sciences, Technology and Communication
Venue:
NMA'10 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Numerical methods and applications
Year:
2010

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Abstract

This paper investigates the conditions in which trust-based cooperation on packet forwarding is unlikely to be developed in mobile ad hoc networks. The analysis is performed by combining genetic algorithms and replicator equation dynamics. We demonstrate that in the presence of a large number of unconditionally cooperative nodes a selfish permanent defection forwarding strategy is more successful than a forgiving version of reciprocal tit-for-tat.