Secure EPC Gen2 Compliant Radio Frequency Identification
ADHOC-NOW '09 Proceedings of the 8th International Conference on Ad-Hoc, Mobile and Wireless Networks
Lightweight RFID authentication with forward and backward security
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
Security analysis and complexity comparison of some recent lightweight RFID protocols
CISIS'11 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Computational intelligence in security for information systems
SAPCC1G2: a mutual authentication protocol promote the security of RFID and WSN integration system
International Journal of Communication Networks and Distributed Systems
Expert Systems with Applications: An International Journal
DPM'11 Proceedings of the 6th international conference, and 4th international conference on Data Privacy Management and Autonomous Spontaneus Security
Concurrency and Computation: Practice & Experience
Journal of Network and Computer Applications
Elliptic curve-based RFID/NFC authentication with temperature sensor input for relay attacks
Decision Support Systems
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EPCglobal Class-1 Generation-2 specification (Gen2 in brief) has been approved as ISO18000-6C for global use, but the identity of tag (TID) is transmitted in plaintext which makes the tag traceable and clonable. Several solutions have been proposed based on traditional encryption methods, such as symmetric or asymmetric ciphers, but they are not suitable for low-cost RFID tags. Recently, some lightweight authentication protocols conforming to Gen2 have been proposed. However, the message flow of these protocols is different from Gen2. Existing readers may fail to read new tags. In this paper, we propose a novel authentication protocol based on Gen2, called Gen2^{+}, for low-cost RFID tags. Our protocol follows every message flow in Gen2 to provide backward compatibility. Gen2^{+} is a multiple round protocol using shared pseudonyms and Cyclic Redundancy Check (CRC) to achieve reader-to-tag authentication. Conversely, Gen2^{+} uses the memory read command defined in Gen2 to achieve tag-to-reader authentication. We show that Gen2^{+} is more secure under tracing and cloning attacks.