EUROCRYPT '93 Workshop on the theory and application of cryptographic techniques on Advances in cryptology
Strand spaces: proving security protocols correct
Journal of Computer Security
Special Uses and Sbuses of the Fiat-Shamir Passport Protocol
CRYPTO '87 A Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques on Advances in Cryptology
Efficient Identification and Signatures for Smart Cards
CRYPTO '89 Proceedings of the 9th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Battery-free Wireless Identification and Sensing
IEEE Pervasive Computing
Picking Virtual Pockets using Relay Attacks on Contactless Smartcard
SECURECOMM '05 Proceedings of the First International Conference on Security and Privacy for Emerging Areas in Communications Networks
An RFID Distance Bounding Protocol
SECURECOMM '05 Proceedings of the First International Conference on Security and Privacy for Emerging Areas in Communications Networks
Protocols for RFID tag/reader authentication
Decision Support Systems
Keep your enemies close: distance bounding against smartcard relay attacks
SS'07 Proceedings of 16th USENIX Security Symposium on USENIX Security Symposium
A Practical Attack on the MIFARE Classic
CARDIS '08 Proceedings of the 8th IFIP WG 8.8/11.2 international conference on Smart Card Research and Advanced Applications
Location privacy of distance bounding protocols
Proceedings of the 15th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Proceedings of the 15th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
A Gen2-Based RFID Authentication Protocol for Security and Privacy
IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing
A secure elliptic curve-based RFID protocol
Journal of Computer Science and Technology
ISC '09 Proceedings of the 12th International Conference on Information Security
RFID Distance Bounding Protocol with Mixed Challenges to Prevent Relay Attacks
CANS '09 Proceedings of the 8th International Conference on Cryptology and Network Security
RFID mutual authentication protocols
Decision Support Systems
A formal approach to distance-bounding RFID protocols
ISC'11 Proceedings of the 14th international conference on Information security
Location-aware and safer cards: enhancing RFID security and privacy via location sensing
Proceedings of the fifth ACM conference on Security and Privacy in Wireless and Mobile Networks
Distance Bounding Protocol for Mutual Authentication
IEEE Transactions on Wireless Communications
On the security of public key protocols
IEEE Transactions on Information Theory
Simultaneous multi-level RFID tag ownership & transfer in health care environments
Decision Support Systems
LATINCRYPT'12 Proceedings of the 2nd international conference on Cryptology and Information Security in Latin America
Analysis of the communication between colluding applications on modern smartphones
Proceedings of the 28th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference
Mutual Distance Bounding Protocols
IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing
Sensory-data-enhanced authentication for RFID-based access control systems
MASS '12 Proceedings of the 2012 IEEE 9th International Conference on Mobile Ad-Hoc and Sensor Systems (MASS)
IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing
| Hi-index | 0.00 |
Unless specifically designed for its prevention, none of the existing RFID authentication protocols are immune to relay attacks. Relay attacks generally involve the presence of one or more adversaries who transfer unmodified messages between a prover and a verifier. Given that the message content is not modified, it is rather difficult to address relay attacks through cryptographic means. Extant attempts to prevent relay attacks involve measuring signal strength, round-trip distance, and ambient conditions in the vicinity of prover and verifier. While a majority of related authentication protocols are based on measuring the round-trip distance between prover and verifier using several single-bit challenge-response pairs, recent discussions include physical proximity verification using ambient conditions to address relay attacks. We provide an overview of existing literature on addressing relay attacks through ambient condition measurements. We then propose an elliptic curve-based mutual authentication protocol that addresses relay attacks based on (a) the surface temperature of the prover as measured by prover and verifier and (b) measured single-bit round-trip times between prover and verifier. We also evaluate the security properties of the proposed authentication protocol.