RFIDs and secret handshakes: defending against ghost-and-leech attacks and unauthorized reads with context-aware communications

  • Authors:

  • Alexei Czeskis;Karl Koscher;Joshua R. Smith;Tadayoshi Kohno

  • Affiliations:

  • University of Washignton, Seattle, WA, USA;University of Washington, Seattle, WA, USA;Intel Research Seattle, Seattle, WA, USA;University of Washington, Seattle, WA, USA

  • Venue:
  • Proceedings of the 15th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
  • Year:
  • 2008

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Abstract

We tackle the problem of defending against ghost-and-leech (a.k.a. proxying, relay, or man-in-the-middle) attacks against RFID tags and other contactless cards. The approach we take -- which we dub secret handshakes -- is to incorporate gesture recognition techniques directly on the RFID tags or contactless cards. These cards will only engage in wireless communications when they internally detect these secret handshakes. We demonstrate the effectiveness of this approach by implementing our secret handshake recognition system on a passive WISP RFID tag with a built-in accelerometer. Our secret handshakes approach is backward compatible with existing deployments of RFID tag and contactless card readers. Our approach was also designed to minimize the changes to the existing usage model of certain classes of RFID and contactless cards, like access cards kept in billfold and purse wallets, allowing the execution of secret handshakes without removing the card from one's wallet. Our techniques could extend to improving the security and privacy properties of other uses of RFID tags, like contactless payment cards.