Vulnerabilities in first-generation RFID-enabled credit cards

  • Authors:
  • Thomas S. Heydt-Benjamin;Daniel V. Bailey;Kevin Fu;Ari Juels;Tom O'Hare

  • Affiliations:
  • University of Massachusetts, Amherst, MA;RSA Laboratories, Bedford, MA;University of Massachusetts, Amherst, MA;RSA Laboratories, Bedford, MA;Innealta, Inc. Salem, MA

  • Venue:
  • FC'07/USEC'07 Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Financial cryptography and 1st International conference on Usable Security
  • Year:
  • 2007

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Abstract

RFID-enabled credit cards are widely deployed in the United States and other countries, but no public study has thoroughly analyzed the mechanisms that provide both security and privacy. Using samples from a variety of RFID-enabled credit cards, our study observes that (1) the cardholder's name and often credit card number and expiration are leaked in plaintext to unauthenticated readers, (2) our homemade device costing around $150 effectively clones one type of skimmed cards thus providing a proof-of-concept implementation for the RF replay attack, (3) information revealed by the RFID transmission cross contaminates the security of RFID and non-RFID payment contexts, and (4) RFID-enabled credit cards are susceptible in various degrees to a range of other traditional RFID attacks such as skimming and relaying.