Privacy Analysis of Forward and Backward Untraceable RFID Authentication Schemes

  • Authors:
  • Raphael C.-W. Phan;Jiang Wu;Khaled Ouafi;Douglas R. Stinson

  • Affiliations:
  • Department of Electronic and Electrical Engineering, Loughborough University, Leicestershire, UK;The Institute of Electronics, Communications and Information Technology, Queen's University Belfast, Belfast, UK;Security and Cryptography Lab (LASEC), EPFL University, Lausanne, Switzerland 1015;David R. Cheriton School of Computer Science, University of Waterloo, Waterloo, Canada

  • Venue:
  • Wireless Personal Communications: An International Journal
  • Year:
  • 2011

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Abstract

In this paper, we analyze the first known provably secure Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) authentication schemes that are designed to provide forward untraceability and backward untraceability: the L-K and S-M schemes. We show how to trace tags in the L-K scheme without needing to corrupt tags. We also show that if a standard cryptographic pseudorandom bit generator (PRBG) is used in the S-M scheme, then the scheme may fail to provide forward untraceability and backward untraceability. To achieve the desired untraceability features, we show that the S-M scheme can use a robust PRBG which provides forward security and backward security. We also note that the backward security is stronger than necessary for the backward untraceability of the S-M scheme.