Security analysis of the Song-Mitchell authentication protocol for low-cost RFID tags

  • Authors:
  • Panagiotis Rizomiliotis;Evangelos Rekleitis;Stefanos Gritzalis

  • Affiliations:
  • Department of Information and Communication Systems Engineering, University of the Aegean, Karlovassi, Samos, Greece;Department of Information and Communication Systems Engineering, University of the Aegean, Karlovassi, Samos, Greece;Department of Information and Communication Systems Engineering, University of the Aegean, Karlovassi, Samos, Greece

  • Venue:
  • IEEE Communications Letters
  • Year:
  • 2009

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Abstract

In this paper, we describe an attack against one of the most efficient authentication protocols for low-cost RFID tags recently proposed by Song and Mitchell. A weak attacker, i.e. an attacker that has no access to the internal data of a tag, is able to impersonate a legitimate reader/server, and to desynchronize a tag. The attack is very efficient and has minimal computational complexity. Finally, we propose a simple solution to fix the flaw.