EUROCRYPT '93 Workshop on the theory and application of cryptographic techniques on Advances in cryptology
PERCOMW '04 Proceedings of the Second IEEE Annual Conference on Pervasive Computing and Communications Workshops
Picking Virtual Pockets using Relay Attacks on Contactless Smartcard
SECURECOMM '05 Proceedings of the First International Conference on Security and Privacy for Emerging Areas in Communications Networks
Protocols for RFID tag/reader authentication
Decision Support Systems
RFID mutual authentication protocols
Decision Support Systems
Adaptive knowledge-based system for health care applications with RFID-generated information
Decision Support Systems
Multi-tag and multi-owner RFID ownership transfer in supply chains
Decision Support Systems
Single RFID Tag Ownership Transfer Protocols
IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics, Part C: Applications and Reviews
Expert Systems with Applications: An International Journal
Two RFID Standard-based Security Protocols for Healthcare Environments
Journal of Medical Systems
Elliptic curve-based RFID/NFC authentication with temperature sensor input for relay attacks
Decision Support Systems
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Authentication of Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) tags takes several forms depending on the dictates of the considered scenario. For example, mutual authentication protocols are used in scenarios where both tag and reader need to authenticate each other. We consider and develop ownership transfer protocols for three scenarios in the health care domain that have not been addressed in extant literature. RFID-tagged items in a health care supply chain experience different levels of ownerships, often simultaneously, throughout their lifetime. We consider a scenario related to ownership of RFID tags in a health care supply chain, specifically the seamless incorporation by a third party logistics provider. Another scenario considered is where tags simultaneously possess a temporary and a permanent key for communicating with a temporary (e.g., rental customer) and a permanent (e.g., owner) user respectively. The third scenario considered is where there are several levels of ownership (e.g., primary owner, rental owner, sub-rental owner). We provide example cases in the health care domain where such scenarios are observed. We then present brief security analyses of the developed protocols.