Barter trade improves message delivery in opportunistic networks

  • Authors:
  • Levente Buttyán;László Dóra;Márk Félegyházi;István Vajda

  • Affiliations:
  • Laboratory of Cryptography and Systems Security (CrySyS), Budapest University of Technology and Economics, Magyar tudósok krt. 2, H-1117 Budapest, Hungary;Laboratory of Cryptography and Systems Security (CrySyS), Budapest University of Technology and Economics, Magyar tudósok krt. 2, H-1117 Budapest, Hungary;University of California, Berkeley, CA, USA;Laboratory of Cryptography and Systems Security (CrySyS), Budapest University of Technology and Economics, Magyar tudósok krt. 2, H-1117 Budapest, Hungary

  • Venue:
  • Ad Hoc Networks
  • Year:
  • 2010

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Abstract

In opportunistic networks, selfish nodes can exploit the services provided by other nodes by downloading messages that interest them, but refusing to store and distribute messages for the benefit of other nodes. We propose a mechanism to discourage selfish behavior based on the principles of barter. We develop a game-theoretic model in which we show that the proposed approach indeed stimulates cooperation of the nodes. The results show that, in practical scenarios, the message delivery rate considerably increases, if the mobile nodes follow the Nash Equilibrium strategy in the proposed mechanism compared to the data dissemination protocol when no encouraging mechanism is present.