Extending match-on-card to local biometric identification
BioID_MultiComm'09 Proceedings of the 2009 joint COST 2101 and 2102 international conference on Biometric ID management and multimodal communication
Negative databases for biometric data
Proceedings of the 12th ACM workshop on Multimedia and security
Secure sketch for multiple secrets
ACNS'10 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Applied cryptography and network security
Contextual biometric-based authentication for ubiquitous services
UIC'10 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Ubiquitous intelligence and computing
Biometric-Based non-transferable anonymous credentials
ICICS'09 Proceedings of the 11th international conference on Information and Communications Security
A quantitative analysis of indistinguishability for a continuous domain biometric cryptosystem
DPM'09/SETOP'09 Proceedings of the 4th international workshop, and Second international conference on Data Privacy Management and Autonomous Spontaneous Security
A historical probability based noise generation strategy for privacy protection in cloud computing
Journal of Computer and System Sciences
A Time-Series Pattern Based Noise Generation Strategy for Privacy Protection in Cloud Computing
CCGRID '12 Proceedings of the 2012 12th IEEE/ACM International Symposium on Cluster, Cloud and Grid Computing (ccgrid 2012)
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The increasing use of biometrics has given rise to new privacy concerns. Biometric encryption systems have been proposed in order to alleviate such concerns: rather than comparing the biometric data directly, a key is derived from these data and subsequently knowledge of this key is proved. One specific application of biometric encryption is the use of biometric sketches: in this case biometric template data are protected with biometric encryption. We address the question whether one can undermine a user's privacy given access to biometrically encrypted documents, and more in particular, we examine if an attacker can determine whether two documents were encrypted using the same biometric. This is a particular concern for biometric sketches that are deployed in multiple locations: in one scenario the same biometric sketch is deployed everywhere; in a second scenario the same biometric data is protected with two different biometric sketches. We present attacks on template protection schemes that can be described as fuzzy sketches based on error-correcting codes. We demonstrate how to link and reverse protected templates produced by code-offset and bit-permutation sketches.