A quantitative analysis of indistinguishability for a continuous domain biometric cryptosystem

  • Authors:
  • Ileana Buhan;Jeroen Breebaart;Jorge Guajardo;Koen de Groot;Emile Kelkboom;Ton Akkermans

  • Affiliations:
  • Philips Research Laboratories, Eindhoven, The Netherlands;Philips Research Laboratories, Eindhoven, The Netherlands;Philips Research Laboratories, Eindhoven, The Netherlands;Philips Research Laboratories, Eindhoven, The Netherlands;Philips Research Laboratories, Eindhoven, The Netherlands;Philips Research Laboratories, Eindhoven, The Netherlands

  • Venue:
  • DPM'09/SETOP'09 Proceedings of the 4th international workshop, and Second international conference on Data Privacy Management and Autonomous Spontaneous Security
  • Year:
  • 2009

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Abstract

Biometric information is regarded as highly sensitive information and therefore encryption techniques for biometric information are needed to address security and privacy requirements of biometric information. Most security analyses for these encryption techniques focus on the scenario of one user enrolled in a single biometric system. In practice, biometric systems are deployed at different places and the scenario of one user enrolled in many biometric systems is closer to reality. In this scenario, cross-matching (tracking users enrolled in multiple databases) becomes an important privacy threat. To prevent such cross-matching, various methods to create renewable and indistinguishable biometric references have been published. In this paper, we investigate the indistinguishability or the protection against cross-matching of a continuous-domain biometric cryptosystem, the QIM. In particular our contributions are as follows. Firstly, we present a technique, which allows an adversary to decide whether two protected biometric reference data come from the same person or not. Secondly, we quantify the probability of success of an adversary who plays the indistinguishability game and thirdly, we compare the probability of success of an adversary to the authentication performance of the biometric system for the MCYT fingerprint database. The results indicate that although biometric cryptosystems represent a step in the direction of privacy enhancement, we are not there yet.