ACM Transactions on Computer Systems (TOCS)
Reasoning about knowledge
Verifying security protocols as planning in logic programming
ACM Transactions on Computational Logic (TOCL) - Special issue devoted to Robert A. Kowalski
Breaking and Fixing the Needham-Schroeder Public-Key Protocol Using FDR
TACAs '96 Proceedings of the Second International Workshop on Tools and Algorithms for Construction and Analysis of Systems
Clasp: a conflict-driven answer set solver
LPNMR'07 Proceedings of the 9th international conference on Logic programming and nonmonotonic reasoning
GrinGo: a new grounder for answer set programming
LPNMR'07 Proceedings of the 9th international conference on Logic programming and nonmonotonic reasoning
A logic programming based framework for security protocol verification
ISMIS'08 Proceedings of the 17th international conference on Foundations of intelligent systems
Security protocols verification in abductive logic programming: a case study
ESAW'05 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Engineering Societies in the Agents World
Formalization of psychological knowledge in answer set programming and its application
Theory and Practice of Logic Programming
ASP as a cognitive modeling tool: short-term memory and long-term memory
Logic programming, knowledge representation, and nonmonotonic reasoning
| Hi-index | 0.00 |
We introduce a general approach to cryptographic protocol verification based on answer set programming. In our approach, cryptographic protocols are represented as extended logic programs where the answer sets correspond to traces of protocol runs. Using queries, we can find attacks on a protocol by finding the answer sets for the corresponding logic program. Our encoding is modular, with different modules representing the message passing environment, the protocol structure and the intruder model. We can easily tailor each module to suit a specific application, while keeping the rest of the encoding constant. As such, our approach is more flexible and elaboration tolerant than related formalizations. The present system is intended as a first step towards the development of a compiler from protocol specifications to executable programs; such a compiler would make verification a completely automated process. This work is also part of a larger project in which we are exploring the advantages of explicit, declarative representations of protocol verification problems.