An attack on a recursive authentication protocol. A cautionary tale
Information Processing Letters
The inductive approach to verifying cryptographic protocols
Journal of Computer Security
Verifying security protocols as planning in logic programming
ACM Transactions on Computational Logic (TOCL) - Special issue devoted to Robert A. Kowalski
Knowledge Representation, Reasoning, and Declarative Problem Solving
Knowledge Representation, Reasoning, and Declarative Problem Solving
Cryptographically Sound and Machine-Assisted Verification of Security Protocols
STACS '03 Proceedings of the 20th Annual Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science
Round-Optimal Contributory Conference Key Agreement
PKC '03 Proceedings of the 6th International Workshop on Theory and Practice in Public Key Cryptography: Public Key Cryptography
Some new attacks upon security protocols
CSFW '96 Proceedings of the 9th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Refuting Security Proofs for Tripartite Key Exchange with Model Checker in Planning Problem Setting
CSFW '06 Proceedings of the 19th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Authenticated key exchange secure against dictionary attacks
EUROCRYPT'00 Proceedings of the 19th international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
A simple threshold authenticated key exchange from short secrets
ASIACRYPT'05 Proceedings of the 11th international conference on Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security
A General Approach to the Verification of Cryptographic Protocols Using Answer Set Programming
LPNMR '09 Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Logic Programming and Nonmonotonic Reasoning
Modeling and analysis of agent-based specifications of security protocols using CSANs and PDETool
IIT'09 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Innovations in information technology
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Security protocol analysis has been a major research topic in information security and recognised to be a notoriously hard problem. In this paper, we take the advantage of answer set programming technology to develop an effective framework to verify security protocols carrying claimed security proof under adversary models on computational complexity theory. In our approach, a security protocol, adversary actions and attacks can be formally specified within a unified logic program. Then the verification is performed in an automatic manner by computing the stable models of the underlying logic program. We use Boyd-González Nieto conference key agreement protocol as our case study protocol to demonstrate the effectiveness and efficiency of our approach.