A digital signature scheme secure against adaptive chosen-message attacks
SIAM Journal on Computing - Special issue on cryptography
The knowledge complexity of interactive proof systems
SIAM Journal on Computing
A probabilistic poly-time framework for protocol analysis
CCS '98 Proceedings of the 5th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
A calculus for cryptographic protocols
Information and Computation
Composition and integrity preservation of secure reactive systems
Proceedings of the 7th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
The inductive approach to verifying cryptographic protocols
Journal of Computer Security
The faithfulness of abstract protocol analysis: message authentication
CCS '01 Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Computer and Communications Security
Distributed Algorithms
Breaking and Fixing the Needham-Schroeder Public-Key Protocol Using FDR
TACAs '96 Proceedings of the Second International Workshop on Tools and Algorithms for Construction and Analysis of Systems
Relations Among Notions of Security for Public-Key Encryption Schemes
CRYPTO '98 Proceedings of the 18th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
A Practical Public Key Cryptosystem Provably Secure Against Adaptive Chosen Ciphertext Attack
CRYPTO '98 Proceedings of the 18th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Reconciling Two Views of Cryptography (The Computational Soundness of Formal Encryption)
TCS '00 Proceedings of the International Conference IFIP on Theoretical Computer Science, Exploring New Frontiers of Theoretical Informatics
FME '02 Proceedings of the International Symposium of Formal Methods Europe on Formal Methods - Getting IT Right
PVS: A Prototype Verification System
CADE-11 Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Automated Deduction: Automated Deduction
Modelling and verifying key-exchange protocols using CSP and FDR
CSFW '95 Proceedings of the 8th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
SP '96 Proceedings of the 1996 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
A Model for Asynchronous Reactive Systems and its Application to Secure Message Transmission
SP '01 Proceedings of the 2001 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Theory and application of trapdoor functions
SFCS '82 Proceedings of the 23rd Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
A composable cryptographic library with nested operations
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Relating cryptography and formal methods: a panel
Proceedings of the 2003 ACM workshop on Formal methods in security engineering
Relating Symbolic and Cryptographic Secrecy
IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing
Weakening the perfect encryption assumption in Dolev-Yao adversaries
Theoretical Computer Science - Theoretical foundations of security analysis and design II
Journal of Computer Security - Special issue on CSFW15
The reactive simulatability (RSIM) framework for asynchronous systems
Information and Computation
Journal of Computer Security - 18th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF 18)
Real-or-random Key Secrecy of the Otway-Rees Protocol via a Symbolic Security Proof
Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science (ENTCS)
Security in business process engineering
BPM'03 Proceedings of the 2003 international conference on Business process management
On simulatability soundness and mapping soundness of symbolic cryptography
FSTTCS'07 Proceedings of the 27th international conference on Foundations of software technology and theoretical computer science
A logic programming based framework for security protocol verification
ISMIS'08 Proceedings of the 17th international conference on Foundations of intelligent systems
Computationally sound symbolic secrecy in the presence of hash functions
FSTTCS'06 Proceedings of the 26th international conference on Foundations of Software Technology and Theoretical Computer Science
Justifying a dolev-yao model under active attacks
Foundations of Security Analysis and Design III
Soundness of formal encryption in the presence of key-cycles
ESORICS'05 Proceedings of the 10th European conference on Research in Computer Security
Cryptographically sound security proofs for basic and public-key kerberos
ESORICS'06 Proceedings of the 11th European conference on Research in Computer Security
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We consider machine-aided verification of suitably constructed abstractions of security protocols, such that the verified properties are valid for the concrete implementation of the protocol with respect to cryptographic definitions. In order to link formal methods and cryptography, we show that integrity properties are preserved under step-wise refinement in asynchronous networks with respect to cryptographic definitions, so formal verifications of our abstractions carry over to the concrete counterparts. As an example, we use the theorem prover PVS to formally verify a system for ordered secure message transmission, which yields the first example ever of a formally verified but nevertheless cryptographically sound proof of a security protocol.We believe that a general methodology for verifying cryptographic protocols cryptographically sound can be derived by following the ideas of this example.