Weakening the perfect encryption assumption in Dolev-Yao adversaries

Authors:
Roberto Zunino;Pierpaolo Degano
Affiliations:
Dipartimento di Informatica, Universit` di Pisa, Pisa, Italy;Dipartimento di Informatica, Universit` di Pisa, Pisa, Italy
Venue:
Theoretical Computer Science - Theoretical foundations of security analysis and design II
Year:
2005

Citing 13
Cited 1

The knowledge complexity of interactive proof-systems

STOC '85 Proceedings of the seventeenth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Bisimulation through probabilistic testing

Information and Computation
A probabilistic logic for the development of safety-critical, interactive systems

International Journal of Man-Machine Studies
A calculus for cryptographic protocols

Information and Computation
Secrecy by typing in security protocols

Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Communicating and mobile systems: the &pgr;-calculus

Communicating and mobile systems: the &pgr;-calculus
Formal Eavesdropping and Its Computational Interpretation

TACS '01 Proceedings of the 4th International Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Software
Cryptographically Sound and Machine-Assisted Verification of Security Protocols

STACS '03 Proceedings of the 20th Annual Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science
Entity Authentication and Key Distribution

CRYPTO '93 Proceedings of the 13th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Approximate Non-Interference

CSFW '02 Proceedings of the 15th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
A Semantic Model for Authentication Protocols

SP '93 Proceedings of the 1993 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Security Properties and CSP

SP '96 Proceedings of the 1996 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Automated analysis of cryptographic protocols using Mur/spl phi/

SP '97 Proceedings of the 1997 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy

Weakening the Dolev-Yao model through probability

Proceedings of the 2nd international conference on Security of information and networks

Quantified Score

Hi-index	0.00

Visualization

Abstract

We consider secrecy and authentication in a simple process calculus with cryptographic primitives. The standard Dolev-Yao adversary is enhanced so that it can guess the key required to decrypt an intercepted message. We borrow from the computational complexity approach the assumptions that guessing succeeds with a given negligible probability and that the resources available to adversaries are polynomially bounded. Under these hypotheses we prove that the standard Dolev-Yao adversary is as powerful as the enhanced one.