An attack on the Needham-Schroeder public-key authentication protocol
Information Processing Letters
A calculus for cryptographic protocols: the spi calculus
Proceedings of the 4th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Communicating and mobile systems: the &pgr;-calculus
Communicating and mobile systems: the &pgr;-calculus
Mobile values, new names, and secure communication
POPL '01 Proceedings of the 28th ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT symposium on Principles of programming languages
Modern Cryptography, Probabilistic Proofs, and Pseudorandomness
Modern Cryptography, Probabilistic Proofs, and Pseudorandomness
Breaking and Fixing the Needham-Schroeder Public-Key Protocol Using FDR
TACAs '96 Proceedings of the Second International Workshop on Tools and Algorithms for Construction and Analysis of Systems
An Efficient Cryptographic Protocol Verifier Based on Prolog Rules
CSFW '01 Proceedings of the 14th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Analyzing security protocols with secrecy types and logic programs
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
A probabilistic polynomial-time process calculus for the analysis of cryptographic protocols
Theoretical Computer Science
Weakening the perfect encryption assumption in Dolev-Yao adversaries
Theoretical Computer Science - Theoretical foundations of security analysis and design II
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The Dolev-Yao model has been widely used in protocol verification and has been implemented in many protocol verifiers. There are strong assumptions underlying this model, such as perfect cryptography: the aim of the present work is to propose an approach to weaken this hypothesis, by means of probabilistic considerations on the strength of cryptographic functions. Such an approach may effectively be implemented in actual protocol verifiers. The Yahalom protocol is used as an easy example to show this approach.