Communicating sequential processes
Communicating sequential processes
A probabilistic poly-time framework for protocol analysis
CCS '98 Proceedings of the 5th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
A calculus for cryptographic protocols
Information and Computation
Composition and integrity preservation of secure reactive systems
Proceedings of the 7th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
The inductive approach to verifying cryptographic protocols
Journal of Computer Security
Distributed Algorithms
Breaking and Fixing the Needham-Schroeder Public-Key Protocol Using FDR
TACAs '96 Proceedings of the Second International Workshop on Tools and Algorithms for Construction and Analysis of Systems
Reconciling Two Views of Cryptography (The Computational Soundness of Formal Encryption)
TCS '00 Proceedings of the International Conference IFIP on Theoretical Computer Science, Exploring New Frontiers of Theoretical Informatics
Probabilistic Polynomial-Time Equivalence and Security Analysis
FM '99 Proceedings of the Wold Congress on Formal Methods in the Development of Computing Systems-Volume I - Volume I
PVS: A Prototype Verification System
CADE-11 Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Automated Deduction: Automated Deduction
I/O Automaton Models and Proofs for Shared-Key Communication Systems
CSFW '99 Proceedings of the 12th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
SP '96 Proceedings of the 1996 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
A Model for Asynchronous Reactive Systems and its Application to Secure Message Transmission
SP '01 Proceedings of the 2001 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Protocols for secure computations
SFCS '82 Proceedings of the 23rd Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Cryptographically Sound and Machine-Assisted Verification of Security Protocols
STACS '03 Proceedings of the 20th Annual Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science
Computational Probabilistic Non-interference
ESORICS '02 Proceedings of the 7th European Symposium on Research in Computer Security
Proactive secure message transmission in asynchronous networks
Proceedings of the twenty-second annual symposium on Principles of distributed computing
A composable cryptographic library with nested operations
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
The faithfulness of abstract protocol analysis: message authentication
Journal of Computer Security - Special issue on ACM conference on computer and communications security, 2001
Journal of Computer Security - Special issue on CSFW15
The reactive simulatability (RSIM) framework for asynchronous systems
Information and Computation
Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science (ENTCS)
Security in business process engineering
BPM'03 Proceedings of the 2003 international conference on Business process management
A Survey of Symbolic Methods in Computational Analysis of Cryptographic Systems
Journal of Automated Reasoning
Justifying a dolev-yao model under active attacks
Foundations of Security Analysis and Design III
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We consider abstract specifications of cryptographic protocols which are both suitable for formal verification and maintain a sound cryptographic semantics. In this paper, we present the first abstract specification for ordered secure message transmission in reactive systems based on the recently published model of Pfitzmann and Waidner. We use their composition theorem to derive a possible implementation whose correctness additionally involves a classical bisimulation, which we formally verify using the theorem prover PVS. The example serves as the first important case study which shows that this approach is applicable in practice, and it is the first example that combines tool-supported formal proof techniques with the rigorous proofs of cryptography.