Assessing Robustness of Reputation Systems Regarding Interdependent Manipulations

Authors:
Ivo Reitzenstein;Ralf Peters
Affiliations:
Chair of E-Business, Martin-Luther-University Halle-Wittenberg, Halle (Saale), Germany 06099;Chair of E-Business, Martin-Luther-University Halle-Wittenberg, Halle (Saale), Germany 06099
Venue:
EC-Web 2009 Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on E-Commerce and Web Technologies
Year:
2009

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Abstract

Reputation systems are subject to several types of manipulations, often in context of fraud. The current literature offers mainly partial solutions for specific manipulations. However, in practice a reputation system should be robust against all relevant threats. This paper explores the combination of several partial solutions in an evolutionary simulation model. The analysis shows that some partial solutions interfere with each other. In particular, it turns out that there is a crucial tradeoff between sanctioning and rehabilitation of bad behaviour that can be solved by a minimal transaction fee.