Strongly Secure Certificateless Key Agreement

Authors:
Georg Lippold;Colin Boyd;Juan Gonzalez Nieto
Affiliations:
Information Security Institute, Queensland University Of Technology, Brisbane, Australia 4001;Information Security Institute, Queensland University Of Technology, Brisbane, Australia 4001;Information Security Institute, Queensland University Of Technology, Brisbane, Australia 4001
Venue:
Pairing '09 Proceedings of the 3rd International Conference Palo Alto on Pairing-Based Cryptography
Year:
2009

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Abstract

We introduce a formal model for certificateless authenticated key exchange (CL-AKE) protocols. Contrary to what might be expected, we show that the natural combination of an ID-based AKE protocol with a public key based AKE protocol cannot provide strong security. We provide the first one-round CL-AKE scheme proven secure in the random oracle model. We introduce two variants of the Diffie-Hellman trapdoor introduced by [4]. The proposed key agreement scheme is secure as long as each party has at least one uncompromised secret. Thus, our scheme is secure even if the key generation centre learns the ephemeral secrets of both parties.