Identity-based cryptosystems and signature schemes
Proceedings of CRYPTO 84 on Advances in cryptology
Strongly Secure Certificateless Key Agreement
Pairing '09 Proceedings of the 3rd International Conference Palo Alto on Pairing-Based Cryptography
A Study of Two-Party Certificateless Authenticated Key-Agreement Protocols
INDOCRYPT '09 Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Cryptology in India: Progress in Cryptology
Simulatable certificateless two-party authenticated key agreement protocol
Information Sciences: an International Journal
Strongly secure certificateless key exchange without pairing
Proceedings of the 6th ACM Symposium on Information, Computer and Communications Security
Toward pairing-free certificateless authenticated key exchanges
ISC'11 Proceedings of the 14th international conference on Information security
A pairing-free certificateless authenticated key agreement protocol
International Journal of Communication Systems
An efficient certificateless two-party authenticated key agreement protocol
Computers & Mathematics with Applications
Provably secure certificateless one-way and two-party authenticated key agreement protocol
ICISC'12 Proceedings of the 15th international conference on Information Security and Cryptology
Authenticated key agreement in wireless networks with automated key management
Proceedings of the 6th International Conference on Security of Information and Networks
Non-Interactive Authenticated Key Agreement over the Mobile Communication Network
Mobile Networks and Applications
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In their seminal paper on certificateless public key cryptography, Al-Riyami and Paterson (AP) proposed a certificateless authenticated key agreement protocol. Key agreement protocols are one of the fundamental primitives of cryptography, and allow users to establish session keys securely in the presence of an active adversary. AP's protocol essentially requires each party to compute four bilinear pairings. Such operations can be computationally expensive, and should therefore be used moderately in key agreement. In this paper, we propose a new certificateless authenticated two-party key agreement protocol that only requires each party to compute two pairings. We analyze the security of the protocol and show that it achieves the desired security attributes. Furthermore, we show that our protocol can be used to establish keys between users of different key generation centers.