Proceedings of the 24th ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT symposium on Principles of programming languages
Validation of HOL Proofs by Proof Checking
Formal Methods in System Design
Automating the implementation of Kalman filter algorithms
ACM Transactions on Mathematical Software (TOMS)
Software certificate management (SoftCeMent'05)
Proceedings of the 20th IEEE/ACM international Conference on Automated software engineering
Annotation Inference for Safety Certification of Automatically Generated Code (Extended Abstract)
ASE '06 Proceedings of the 21st IEEE/ACM International Conference on Automated Software Engineering
Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Generative programming and component engineering
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We present an approach to systematically derive safety cases for automatically generated code from information collected during a formal, Hoare-style safety certification of the code. This safety case makes explicit the formal and informal reasoning principles, and reveals the top-level assumptions and external dependencies that must be taken into account; however, the evidence still comes from the formal safety proofs. It uses a generic goal-based argument that is instantiated with respect to the certified safety property (i.e., safety claims) and the program. This will be combined with a complementary safety case that argues the safety of the framework itself, in particular the correctness of the Hoare rules with respect to the safety property and the trustworthiness of the certification system and its individual components.