Propositional knowledge base revision and minimal change
Artificial Intelligence
Unifying default reasoning and belief revision in a modal framework
Artificial Intelligence
Qualitative probabilities for default reasoning, belief revision, and causal modeling
Artificial Intelligence
On the logic of iterated belief revision
Artificial Intelligence
Characterizing the principle of minimum cross-entropy within a conditional-logical framework
Artificial Intelligence
The Principle of Conditional Preservation in Belief Revision
FoIKS '02 Proceedings of the Second International Symposium on Foundations of Information and Knowledge Systems
Handling Conditionals Adequately in Uncertain Reasoning
ECSQARU '01 Proceedings of the 6th European Conference on Symbolic and Quantitative Approaches to Reasoning with Uncertainty
Following Conditional Structures of Knowledge
KI '99 Proceedings of the 23rd Annual German Conference on Artificial Intelligence: Advances in Artificial Intelligence
Conditionals in nonmonotonic reasoning and belief revision: considering conditionals as agents
Conditionals in nonmonotonic reasoning and belief revision: considering conditionals as agents
Projective default epistemology
WCII'02 Proceedings of the 2002 international conference on Conditionals, Information, and Inference
On the logic of iterated non-prioritised revision
WCII'02 Proceedings of the 2002 international conference on Conditionals, Information, and Inference
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In this paper, we present a scheme of postulates for revising epistemic states by conditional beliefs. These postulates are supported mainly by following the specific, non-classical nature of conditionals, and the aim of preserving conditional beliefs is achieved by studying specific interactions between conditionals, represented properly by two relations. Because one of the postulates claims propositional belief revision to be a special case of conditional belief revision, our framework also covers the work of Darwiche and Pearl [Darwiche and Pearl, 1997], and we show that all postulates presented there may be derived from our postulates. We state representation theorems for the principal postulates, and finally, we present a conditional belief operator obeying all of the postulates by using ordinal conditional functions as representations of epistemic states.