Following Conditional Structures of Knowledge

  • Authors:
  • Gabriele Kern-Isberner

  • Affiliations:
  • -

  • Venue:
  • KI '99 Proceedings of the 23rd Annual German Conference on Artificial Intelligence: Advances in Artificial Intelligence
  • Year:
  • 1999

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Abstract

Conditionals are not only central items for knowledge representation, but also play an important part in belief revision, in particular when dealing with iterated belief revision. To handle conditional beliefs appropriately, epistemic states instead of propositional belief sets have to be considered. Within this framework, the preservation of conditional beliefs turns out to be a principal concern, corresponding to the paradigm of minimal propositional change to be found in AGM theory. In this paper, we deal with the revision of epistemic states by conditional beliefs, thus extending the usual framework of only taking propositional or factual beliefs as new information. We present a thorough formalization of the principle of conditional preservation under revision for ordinal conditional functions, commonly regarded as appropriate representations of epistemic states. Though apparently quite simple and elementary, this formal principle will be shown to imply the postulates dealing with conditional preservation stated in other papers.