An experimental analysis of multi-attribute auctions
Decision Support Systems
Collaborative reputation mechanisms for electronic marketplaces
Decision Support Systems - Special issue for business to business electronic commerce, issues and solutions
Intelligent agents for automated one-to-many e-commerce negotiation
ACSC '02 Proceedings of the twenty-fifth Australasian conference on Computer science - Volume 4
Combinatorial Auctions: A Survey
INFORMS Journal on Computing
Strategy/False-name Proof Protocols for Combinatorial Multi-Attribute Procurement Auction
AAMAS '04 Proceedings of the Third International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 1
Secure Computation for Combinatorial Auctions and Market Exchanges
AAMAS '04 Proceedings of the Third International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 3
The Knowledge Engineering Review
Computationally-efficient combinatorial auctions for resource allocation in weakly-coupled MDPs
Proceedings of the fourth international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
buySAFE: Creating and Profiting from the Bonded Seller^TM Advantage
HICSS '07 Proceedings of the 40th Annual Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences
An overview of combinatorial auctions
ACM SIGecom Exchanges
Mixed multi-unit combinatorial auctions for supply chain management
ACM SIGecom Exchanges
Fault tolerant mechanism design
Artificial Intelligence
Simulating the effect of reputation systems on E-markets
iTrust'03 Proceedings of the 1st international conference on Trust management
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As the use of automated negotiations becomes more mainstream, one key attribute that needs to be incorporated is a measure of a seller's trust or reliability. In this paper, we describe a combinatorial auction mechanism that allows buyers to specify their preferences over both an item and the seller's trustworthiness, and use it to generate a bid for a bundle of items. We consider some implications of generating a combined trust rating for a bundle of resources that are supplied by more than one seller. We show that allowing buyers to specify trust preferences leads to a higher overall utility and task completion rate than when compared with a model that does not consider seller trustworthiness.