Economic models for allocating resources in computer systems
Market-based control
Solving very large weakly coupled Markov decision processes
AAAI '98/IAAI '98 Proceedings of the fifteenth national/tenth conference on Artificial intelligence/Innovative applications of artificial intelligence
Computationally Manageable Combinational Auctions
Management Science
How to dynamically merge Markov decision processes
NIPS '97 Proceedings of the 1997 conference on Advances in neural information processing systems 10
Solving concisely expressed combinatorial auction problems
Eighteenth national conference on Artificial intelligence
Iterative combinatorial auctions: achieving economic and computational efficiency
Iterative combinatorial auctions: achieving economic and computational efficiency
Combinatorial Auctions: A Survey
INFORMS Journal on Computing
Distributed Implementations of Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Mechanisms
AAMAS '04 Proceedings of the Third International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 1
Bidding languages for combinatorial auctions
IJCAI'01 Proceedings of the 17th international joint conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 2
Exploiting structure in policy construction
IJCAI'95 Proceedings of the 14th international joint conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 2
Resource allocation among agents with preferences induced by factored MDPs
AAMAS '06 Proceedings of the fifth international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
Sequential resource allocation in multiagent systems with uncertainties
Proceedings of the 6th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
Combinatorial resource scheduling for multiagent MDPs
Proceedings of the 6th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
Incorporating Trust into Combinatorial Auctions: What Does Trust Cost?
WI-IAT '09 Proceedings of the 2009 IEEE/WIC/ACM International Joint Conference on Web Intelligence and Intelligent Agent Technology - Volume 03
Resource-driven mission-phasing techniques for constrained agents in stochastic environments
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Declarative Specification Of Fault Tolerant Auction Protocols: The English Auction Case Study
Computational Intelligence
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The capabilities of an autonomous agent are often determined by the resources that are available to it. We examine the problem of allocating scarce resources among multiple self-interested agents, operating in complex, stochastic environments (modeled as MDPs), where the value of a particular resource bundle to an agent is the expected payoff of the best control policy the agent can implement using these resources. Combinatorial auctions are popular mechanisms for allocating resource bundles among agents with such complex preferences. In particular, generalized Vickrey auctions (GVAs) yield socially optimal outcomes and have excellent strategic complexity, but suffer from high computational complexity for the agents' preference-valuation and the auctioneer's winner-determination problems. We describe a GVA-based mechanism that exploits knowledge of the agents' MDP-based resource preferences, and we show analytically and demonstrate empirically that this leads to an exponential improvement in computational efficiency over a straightforward GVA implementation with flat preferences. We also present a distributed implementation of the winner-determination problem that leads to further speedup while maintaining strategy-proofness of the mechanism, and without revealing agents' private MDP information.