Coordinating Multiple Concurrent Negotiations
AAMAS '04 Proceedings of the Third International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 3
Alternating-offers bargaining with one-sided uncertain deadlines: an efficient algorithm
Artificial Intelligence
Decommitment in multi-resource negotiation
Proceedings of the 7th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems - Volume 3
Automated negotiation with decommitment for dynamic resource allocation in cloud computing
Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems: volume 1 - Volume 1
Strategic agents for multi-resource negotiation
Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems
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Automating negotiations in markets where multiple buyers and sellers operate is a scientific challenge of extraordinary importance. One-to-one negotiations are classically studied as bilateral bargaining problems, while one-to-many and many-to-many negotiations are studied as auctioning problems. This paper aims at bridging together these two approaches, analyzing agents’ strategic behavior in one-to-many and many-to-many negotiations when agents follow the alternating-offers bargaining protocol [5]. First, we propose a novel mechanism that captures the peculiarities of these settings. Then, we preliminarily explore how uncertainty over reserve prices and deadlines can affect equilibrium strategies. Surprisingly, the computation of the equilibrium for realistic ranges of the parameters in one-to-many settings is reduced to the computation of the equilibrium either in one-to-one settings with uncertainty or in one-to-many settings without uncertainty.