Bargaining under two-sided incomplete information: the unrestricted offers case
Operations Research
Rules of encounter: designing conventions for automated negotiation among computers
Rules of encounter: designing conventions for automated negotiation among computers
Fast algorithms for finding randomized strategies in game trees
STOC '94 Proceedings of the twenty-sixth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Representations and solutions for game-theoretic problems
Artificial Intelligence - Special issue on economic principles of multi-agent systems
Communications of the ACM
AAAI '99/IAAI '99 Proceedings of the sixteenth national conference on Artificial intelligence and the eleventh Innovative applications of artificial intelligence conference innovative applications of artificial intelligence
Strategic negotiation in multiagent environments
Strategic negotiation in multiagent environments
Multi-issue negotiation under time constraints
Proceedings of the first international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems: part 1
Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems
An agenda-based framework for multi-issue negotiation
Artificial Intelligence
Computing sequential equilibria for two-player games
SODA '06 Proceedings of the seventeenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithm
Finding equilibria in large sequential games of imperfect information
EC '06 Proceedings of the 7th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Bargaining over multiple issues in finite horizon alternating-offers protocol
Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence
An agent architecture for multi-attribute negotiation using incomplete preference information
Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems
A formal framework for connective stability of highly decentralized cooperative negotiations
Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems
Proceedings of the 6th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
Alternating-Offers Bargaining under One-Sided Uncertainty on Deadlines
Proceedings of the 2006 conference on ECAI 2006: 17th European Conference on Artificial Intelligence August 29 -- September 1, 2006, Riva del Garda, Italy
Multi-issue negotiation with deadlines
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
On efficient procedures for multi-issue negotiation
TADA/AMEC'06 Proceedings of the 2006 AAMAS workshop and TADA/AMEC 2006 conference on Agent-mediated electronic commerce: automated negotiation and strategy design for electronic markets
Game Theoretical Insights in Strategic Patrolling: Model and Algorithm in Normal-Form
Proceedings of the 2008 conference on ECAI 2008: 18th European Conference on Artificial Intelligence
Bilateral Bargaining with One-Sided Two-Type Uncertainty
WI-IAT '09 Proceedings of the 2009 IEEE/WIC/ACM International Joint Conference on Web Intelligence and Intelligent Agent Technology - Volume 02
Extending Alternating-Offers Bargaining in One-to-Many and Many-to-Many Settings
WI-IAT '09 Proceedings of the 2009 IEEE/WIC/ACM International Joint Conference on Web Intelligence and Intelligent Agent Technology - Volume 02
WI-IAT '09 Proceedings of the 2009 IEEE/WIC/ACM International Joint Conference on Web Intelligence and Intelligent Agent Technology - Volume 02
Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence
Automated negotiation with decommitment for dynamic resource allocation in cloud computing
Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems: volume 1 - Volume 1
An algorithmic game theory framework for bilateral bargaining with uncertainty
Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems: volume 1 - Volume 1
Searching for pure strategy equilibria in bilateral bargaining with one-sided uncertainty
Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems: volume 1 - Volume 1
An algorithmic game theory study of wholesale electricity markets based on central auction
Integrated Computer-Aided Engineering - Multi-Agent Systems for Energy Management
Strategic agents for multi-resource negotiation
Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems
Solving strategic bargaining with arbitrary one-sided uncertainty
The 10th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 3
Bilateral bargaining with one-sided uncertain reserve prices
Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems
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In the arena of automated negotiations we focus on the principal negotiation protocol in bilateral settings, i.e. the alternating-offers protocol. In the scientific community it is common the idea that bargaining in the alternating-offers protocol will play a crucial role in the automation of electronic transactions. Notwithstanding its prominence, literature does not present a satisfactory solution to the alternating-offers protocol in real-world settings, e.g. in presence of uncertainty. In this paper we game theoretically analyze this negotiation problem with one-sided uncertain deadlines and we provide an efficient solving algorithm. Specifically, we analyze the situation where the values of the parameters of the buyer are uncertain to the seller, whereas the parameters of the seller are common knowledge (the analysis of the reverse situation is analogous). In this particular situation the results present in literature are not satisfactory, since they do not assure the existence of an equilibrium for every value of the parameters. From our game theoretical analysis we find two choice rules that apply an action and a probability distribution over the actions, respectively, to every time point and we find the conditions on the parameters such that each choice rule can be singularly employed to produce an equilibrium. These conditions are mutually exclusive. We show that it is always possible to produce an equilibrium where the actions, at any single time point, are those prescribed either by the first choice rule or by the second one. We exploit this result for developing a solving algorithm. The proposed algorithm works backward by computing the equilibrium from the last possible deadline of the bargaining to the initial time point and by applying at each time point the actions prescribed by the choice rule whose conditions are satisfied. The computational complexity of the proposed algorithm is asymptotically independent of the number of types of the player whose deadline is uncertain. With linear utility functions, it is O(m@?T@?) where m is the number of the issues and T@? is the length of the bargaining.