Alternating-Offers Bargaining under One-Sided Uncertainty on Deadlines

Authors:
Francesco Di Giunta;Nicola Gatti
Affiliations:
Politecnico di Milano,Italy, email: {digiunta, ngatti}@elet.polimi.it;Politecnico di Milano,Italy, email: {digiunta, ngatti}@elet.polimi.it
Venue:
Proceedings of the 2006 conference on ECAI 2006: 17th European Conference on Artificial Intelligence August 29 -- September 1, 2006, Riva del Garda, Italy
Year:
2006

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Abstract

Alternating-offers is the most prominent negotiation protocol for automatic bilateral bargaining. Nevertheless, in most settings it is still not known how two fully rational agents should behave in the protocol. In this paper we study the finite-horizon alternating-offers protocol under one-sided uncertain deadlines. We make a novel use of backward induction in studying bargaining with uncertainty; we employ a “natural” system of beliefs and find, when it exists, the pertinent pure strategy sequential equilibrium. We further show, as an intrinsic limitation of the protocol, that for some parameter values there is no pure strategy sequential equilibrium, whatever system of beliefs is employed.