Introduction to algorithms
Knapsack problems: algorithms and computer implementations
Knapsack problems: algorithms and computer implementations
AAAI '99/IAAI '99 Proceedings of the sixteenth national conference on Artificial intelligence and the eleventh Innovative applications of artificial intelligence conference innovative applications of artificial intelligence
Strategic negotiation in multiagent environments
Strategic negotiation in multiagent environments
An agenda-based framework for multi-issue negotiation
Artificial Intelligence
Multi-issue negotiation with deadlines
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
A multilateral multi-issue negotiation protocol
Proceedings of the 6th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
Alternating-offers bargaining with one-sided uncertain deadlines: an efficient algorithm
Artificial Intelligence
Multi-issue negotiation with deadlines
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Bilateral Bargaining with One-Sided Two-Type Uncertainty
WI-IAT '09 Proceedings of the 2009 IEEE/WIC/ACM International Joint Conference on Web Intelligence and Intelligent Agent Technology - Volume 02
An algorithmic game theory framework for bilateral bargaining with uncertainty
Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems: volume 1 - Volume 1
Toward emotional E-commerce: formalizing agents for a simple negotiation protocol
KES'10 Proceedings of the 14th international conference on Knowledge-based and intelligent information and engineering systems: Part I
Formalizing emotional e-commerce agents for a simple negotiation protocol
Transactions on Computational Collective Intelligence VII
Bilateral bargaining with one-sided uncertain reserve prices
Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems
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This paper studies bilateral, multi-issue negotiation between self interested agents with deadlines. There are a number of procedures for negotiating the issues and each of these gives a different outcome. Thus, a key problem is to decide which one to use. Given this, we study the three main alternatives: the package deal, the simultaneous procedure, and the sequential procedure. First, we determine equilibria for the case where each agent is uncertain about its opponent's deadline. We then compare the outcomes for these procedures and determine the one that is optimal (in this case, the package deal is optimal for each party). We then compare the procedures in terms of their time complexity, the uniqueness and Pareto optimality of their solutions, and their time of agreement.