Bargaining under two-sided incomplete information: the unrestricted offers case
Operations Research
Computing sequential equilibria for two-player games
SODA '06 Proceedings of the seventeenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithm
Alternating-offers bargaining with one-sided uncertain deadlines: an efficient algorithm
Artificial Intelligence
Multi-issue negotiation with deadlines
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
On efficient procedures for multi-issue negotiation
TADA/AMEC'06 Proceedings of the 2006 AAMAS workshop and TADA/AMEC 2006 conference on Agent-mediated electronic commerce: automated negotiation and strategy design for electronic markets
Automated negotiation with decommitment for dynamic resource allocation in cloud computing
Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems: volume 1 - Volume 1
Searching for pure strategy equilibria in bilateral bargaining with one-sided uncertainty
Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems: volume 1 - Volume 1
Bilateral bargaining with one-sided uncertain reserve prices
Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems
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It is a challenging problem to find agents’ rational strategies in bargaining with incomplete information. In this paper we perform a game theoretic analysis of agents’ rational strategies in finite horizon bilateral bargaining with one-sided uncertainty regarding agents’ reserve prices. The negotiation setting considered in this paper has four features: alternating-offers bargaining protocol, finite horizon, two-type uncertainty about agents’ reserve prices, and discount factors. The main contribution of this paper is the development of a novel algorithm to find a pure strategy sequential equilibrium in the setting we study. Our algorithm is based on the combination of game theoretic analysis and search techniques which finds agents’ equilibrium in pure strategies when they exist.