Computing sequential equilibria for two-player games
SODA '06 Proceedings of the seventeenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithm
Alternating-offers bargaining with one-sided uncertain deadlines: an efficient algorithm
Artificial Intelligence
Bilateral Bargaining with One-Sided Two-Type Uncertainty
WI-IAT '09 Proceedings of the 2009 IEEE/WIC/ACM International Joint Conference on Web Intelligence and Intelligent Agent Technology - Volume 02
Using Gaussian processes to optimise concession in complex negotiations against unknown opponents
IJCAI'11 Proceedings of the Twenty-Second international joint conference on Artificial Intelligence - Volume Volume One
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The problem of finding agents' rational strategies in bargaining with incomplete information is well known to be challenging. The literature provides a collection of results for very narrow uncertainty settings, but no generally applicable algorithm. In this paper, we focus on the alternating-offers finite horizon bargaining protocol with one-sided uncertainty regarding agents' reserve prices. We provide an algorithm based on the combination of game theoretic analysis and search techniques which finds agents' equilibrium in pure strategies when they exist. Our approach is sound, complete and, in principle, can be applied to other uncertainty settings.