Stable strategies for sharing information among agents

  • Authors:
  • Rina Azoulay-Schwartz;Sarit Kraus

  • Affiliations:
  • Department of Mathematics and Computer Science, Bar-Ilan University, Ramat-Gan, Israel;Department of Mathematics and Computer Science, Bar-Ilan University, Ramat-Gan, Israel and Institute for Advanced Computer Studies, University of Maryland, College Park, MD

  • Venue:
  • IJCAI'01 Proceedings of the 17th international joint conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 2
  • Year:
  • 2001

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Abstract

Information sharing is important for different goals, such as sharing reputations of sellers among potential buyers, load balancing, solving technical problems, etc. In the short run, providing information as a response to queries is often unbeneficial. In the long run, mechanisms that enable beneficial stable strategies for information exchange can be found. This paper presents such mechanisms and specifies under which conditions it is beneficial to the agents to answer queries. We analyze a model of repeated encounters in which two agents ask each other queriesover time. We present different strategies that enable information exchange, and compare them according to the expected utility for the agents, and the conditions required for the cooperative equilibrium to exist.